The path to hell, it is said, is paved with good intentions. Aadhaar is a case in point.
Originally launched to prevent slippages in the transfer of government benefits to those it is earmarked for, Aadhaar today has become the go-to solution for anything to do with identity. This change in the scope and application of Aadhaar has created a monster — because, first, it is not designed to be a system of identity; second, its implementation has many practical limitations, and third, it forces citizens to do things they may not wish to do.
Impractical design
Consider its design. The UIDAI website clearly states, “…who is a resident of India, may voluntarily enrol to obtain Aadhaar number.” If Aadhaar is voluntary, why should anyone opt for it? The Centre can specify that government benefits, particularly the flow of subsidies, will be based only on Aadhaar verification. In such an event, it is the resident’s choice to enrol or not, depending on their desire to avail the benefits. By mandating Aadhaar linkage to services that do not involve any benefit , the Centre is forcing enrolment down our throats, , whether we like it or not.
Another issue with the design is one of applicability. Aadhaar is designed for financial inclusion and public service delivery. The underlying rationale, at least as articulated when it was launched, was that the poorer and less literate sections of society did not have access to identity documents and/or the wherewithal to engage with financial institutions. Thus, for residents who have access to other government issued documentation, such as driving licence, passport and voter ID, that validate identity as well as residence, Aadhaar is redundant. True, in a country where exploiting the system for nefarious ends is rampant, there is room for misuse and abuse. The solution, however, is not to create one more piece of bureaucracy, but to strengthen existing systems and prevent their misuse.
The third aspect of the flawed design is its inability to accommodate mobility of residents of the country or situations that senior citizens encounter. Take the former — there are individuals who have residences in different cities. They require services such as banks, gas and utilities in all cities. The current design of Aadhaar does not permit registration of multiple addresses, consequently residents are deprived of services in a city where the address is not as per the Aadhaar.
Similarly, consider the case of a government pensioner who lives with a child in City A, but has a bank account in City B, where the account was created when the pensioner retired. With the new dispensation that requires one to link Aadhaar with bank accounts, such a pensioner would find it difficult since the addresses won’t match.
There are several other similar reasons why Aadhaar’s design is dysfunctional.
Practical implementation
Moving away from design, let us look at the practical issues that hinder the implementation of Aadhaar. The issue of fingerprints not matching has been reported extensively. Of what use is a bio-metric system if it fails in its basic function of providing authentication? Further, UIDAI employs cyclical logic in implementing changes in registrants’ data.
For instance, UIDAI’s process to change one’s mobile number online requires it to send a One Time Password (OTP) to the mobile number registered with Aadhaar. It would seem that the administrators of Aadhaar have not considered the possibility that people might want to change their mobile numbers because the previously registered one is inoperable! In such a situation, sending an OTP to the previously registered number, apart from being inane, could also be a potential security risk, since the OTP could fall into the wrong hands.
This is all the more acute since UIDAI’s services rely heavily on mobile phones. Many instances of linking Aadhaar or updating Aadhaar data require the use of an OTP, either to authenticate changes or permit changes. UIDAI has not considered that there may be individuals who do not want to use a mobile phone or e-mail. Has it considered the difficulty that senior citizens, or those who are not facile with technology, may face with this requirement? Since Aadhaar is applicable even to a newborn baby, do they want them to come with the digital gadgets? Is UIDAI the administrator of an identity system or a wholesale agent for cellular and e-mail service providers?
Similarly, their other systems of redressal are completely inadequate. Calling ‘1947’ does not provide any means to register a complaint; complaints registered on their help desks are reported as resolved even when the problems persist; calls to the slew of telephone numbers of officers provided on the website are not answered — all this from an organisation that prides itself as ‘…one of the key pillars of the ‘Digital India’!
Pain to citizens
This is not to say that a Universal Identity System is not desirable. However, the system should be designed around the ease of use by the residents. Such residents include temporary residents — expatriates working in India and Indians who have taken citizenship of other countries but reside in India; the very young and the very old; the blind and the visually impaired; those without hands, and so on.
Second, such a system needs to consider multiple use case scenarios and build a framework that works for the vast majority of such scenarios, with the provision for exceptions to be handled. Currently, Aadhaar has a ‘one-shoe-fits-all’ framework, with no remedy to handle exceptions.
Third, any implementation of a new process or system for such a large population is fraught with unexpected situations and unintended consequences. Therefore, it would be prudent that the implementation be piloted and the kinks ironed out before scaling the implementation. In a country that is as large as India, perhaps a graded time-frame for implementation would be apposite rather than a brusque, deadline-oriented approach that causes stress and trauma to the citizens. After all, the government is there to help the people, not cause them pain!
Ease of burden
The current strong-arm tactic to withhold services or disallow access to financial accounts if one does not link them with Aadhaar, is more commonly associated with criminals and not with a people-sensitive government. Worse, the government does not seem to realise that such threats are aimed at services obtained by the residents with their hard-earned income and are not some government largesse. Sure, some individuals game the system, but that is not sufficient reason to tar the entire citizenry with the same brush. Why should the majority suffer for the activities of a minority?
It does not behove those elected and appointed to serve the people of India, the netas , and the babus , to be high-handed in their use of the authority delegated to them by the people, when in actual fact they should be making efforts to ease their burdens.
Will sense prevail?
(The writer is the director of Rage Communications, a digital marketing company .)